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In this document, we describe the design of a new family of block ciphers, named FOX. The
main goals of this design, besides a very high security level, are a large implementation flex-
ibility on various platforms as well as high performances. The high-level structure is based
on a Lai-Massey scheme, while the round functions are substitution-permutation networks. In
addition, we propose a new design of strong and efficient key-schedule algorithms.
FOX is the result of a joint project with the company Mediacrypt AG in Zu¨rich, Switerland
(website http://www.mediacrypt.com); the design has furthermore benefited from expert re-
views of Prof. Jacques Stern, E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, Paris (France) and of Prof. David
Wagner, University of California, Berkeley (USA).
FOX may be subject to patenting and licensing issues. Please contact Mediacrypt (email
info@mediacrypt.com) for more information about them.
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Preface
This document presents the specifications and rationales of the block cipher family FOX; it is
organized as follows: in §1, the conventions and notations used throughout this document are
described. §2 describes formally the cipher family, while §3 gives the mathematical foundations
and rationales behind FOX. §4 discusses several issues related to the implementation of FOX. In
Appendix, a reference implementation written in C is given; its sole goal is to help to understand
how FOX is defined and to furnish test vectors.




The notations, conventions and symbols used throughout this document are described here.
1.1 Algorithm Names
The name of the family of block ciphers described in this document is FOX. The different
members of this family are denoted as follows:
Name Block size Key size Rounds number
FOX64 64 128 16
FOX128 128 256 16
FOX64/k/r 64 k r
FOX128/k/r 128 k r
The following conditions must hold in the case of FOX64/k/r and FOX128/k/r:
- 12 ≤ r ≤ 255
- 0 ≤ k ≤ 256 with k divisible by 8.
1.2 Hexadecimal Notation
The hexadecimal notation will be intensively used in this document to write binary strings in
a compact way. Numbers written in hexadecimal notations begins with the prefix 0x. For
instance, 0x01234567 is a 32-bit value. The following table gives the correspondance between
decimal digits, hexadecimal digits and binary values.
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Decimal 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Binary 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111
Hexadecimal 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7
Decimal 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Binary 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
Hexadecimal 0x8 0x9 0xA 0xB 0xC 0xD 0xE 0xF
1.3 Mathematical Operations




bac “Floor” function b12.34c = 12
dae “Ceil” function d12.34e = 13
a⊕ b Bitwise exclusive-OR 0xABCD⊕ 0x1234 = 0xB9F9
a ∧ b Bitwise AND 0xABCD ∧ 0x1234 = 0x0204
a ∨ b Bitwise OR 0xABCD ∨ 0x1234 = 0xBBFD
a¿ n Logical left shift of n positions 0x03¿ 1 = 0x06
aÀ n Logical right shift of n positions 0x03À 1 = 0x01
a Logical negation 0xA = 0x5
a||b Concatenation 0xABCD||0x1234 = 0xABCD1234
a⊕ b Addition in GF(28) 0x02⊕ 0x06 = 0x04
a · b Multiplication in GF(28) 0x02 · 0x60 = 0xC0
, Assignment operator
Note that the GF(28) representation is defined in §1.5.
1.4 Prefixes, Indices and Suffixes
Here are some generic conventions used in the notation:
- A variable x written with the suffix (n) (i.e. x(n)) indicates that x has a length of n bits.
For instance, y(1) is a single-bit variable and F(64) is a 64-bit value. The suffix will be
omitted if the context is clear.
- A variable x written with the suffix [a...n] (i.e. x[a...b]) indicates the bit subset of the
variable x beginning at position a (inclusive) and ending at position b (inclusive).
- Indexed variables are denoted as follows: xi is a variable x indexed by i. A variable x
indexed by i with a length of ` bits is denoted xi(`). A C-like notation is used for indexing
which means that indices begin with 0.
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- The suffix L is used to denote the left half of a variable. For instance, xL is the left half
of the variable x.
- The suffix R is used to denote the right half of a variable. For instance, xR is the right
half of the variable x.
- The suffixes LL, LR, RL, RR are used to denote quarters of a variable. For instance,
X , XLL||XLR||XRL||XRR.
- In general, the input of a function f is denoted X and its output Y .
1.5 Byte Ordering
In this document, a big-endian ordering is assumed. The index of the most significant part in a
variable is equal to 0, while the index corresponding to the least significant part is the largest
one.
Here is an example: a 128-bit value Q(128) can be written as
Q(128) = R0(64)||R1(64)
= S0(32)||S1(32)||S2(32)||S3(32)
= T0(8)||T1(8)|| . . . ||T14(8)||T15(8)
= U0(1)||U1(1)|| . . . ||U126(1)||U127(1)
1.6 Finite Field GF(28)
Some of the mathematical operations used in FOX are the addition and the multiplication in
the finite field with 256 elements, which is denoted GF(28). We describe now the representation
of GF(28) used in the FOX definition. Let be the following irreducible polynomial P (α) over
GF(2) = {0, 1}:
P (α) , α8 + α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + 1 (1.1)
Elements of the field are polynomials in α of degree at most 7 with coefficients in GF(2).
Let s be an 8-bit binary string
s , s0(1)||s1(1)||s2(1)||s3(1)||s4(1)||s5(1)||s6(1)||s7(1) (1.2)







2 + s6(1)α+ s7(1) (1.3)
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1.6.1 Addition in GF(28)
The addition in GF(28), denoted ⊕ is the usual addition of polynomials where the respective
coefficients are added modulo 2. For instance,
(α7 + α6 + α3 + α2 + 1)⊕ (α6 + α5 + α+ 1) = α7 + α5 + α3 + α2 + α (1.4)
Note that the addition a⊕ b of two elements of GF(28) is equivalent to a bitwise exclusive-OR
operation of their representation as an 8-bit binary string.
1.6.2 Multiplication in GF(28)
The multiplication in GF(28), denoted “·”, is the usual multiplication of polynomials where the
result is taken modulo the polynomial defined in (1.1) and coefficients are reduced modulo 2.
The reduction modulo P (α) can be computed by taking the rest of the Euclidean division of
the product by P (α). For instance,
(α5 + α4 + α3) · (α3 + α+ 1) = α8 + α6 + α5
≡ α7 + α4 + α+ 1 (mod P (α))




In this part of the document, we describe precisely both versions of FOX, i.e. the one having a
64-bit block size (FOX64/k/r) and the one with a block size of 128 bits (FOX128/k/r).
This chapter is organized as follows: in §2.1, the high-level structure of FOX64/k/r, which
is a Lai-Massey scheme, is formally described, together with the encryption and decryption
operations. In §2.2, the same is done for FOX128/k/r, which is built on an Extended Lai-
Massey scheme. In §2.3, the internal functions f32 and f64 used in both algorithms are formally
defined, together with their building blocks. Finally, in §2.4, the key-schedule algorithm is
described.
2.1 FOX64/k/r Skeleton
In this section, we describe the high-level structure of the 64-bit version of FOX in a top-down
approach.
The 64-bit version of FOX is the (r− 1)-times iteration of a round function denoted lmor64,
followed by the application of a slightly modified version of lmor64, denoted by lmid64. lmio64
is a function used during the decryption operation. Formally, lmor64, lmio64 and lmid64 take
all a 64-bit input X(64), a 64-bit round key RK(64) and return a 64-bit output Y(64):
lmor64, lmio64, lmid64 :
{ {0, 1}64 × {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64
(X(64), RK(64)) 7→ Y(64) (2.1)
2.1.1 Encryption
The encryption C(64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit plaintext P(64) is formally defined as
C(64) , lmid64(lmor64(. . . (lmor64(P(64), RK0(64)), . . . , RKr−2(64)), RKr−1(64)) (2.2)
where
RK(r·64) , RK0(64)||RK1(64)|| . . . ||RKr−1(64) (2.3)
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is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm out of the key K(k).
2.1.2 Decryption
The decryption P(64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit ciphertext C(64) is formally defined as
P(64) , lmid64(lmio64(. . . (lmio64(C(64), RKr−1(64)), . . . , RK1(64)), RK0(64)) (2.4)
where
RK(r·64) , RK0(64)||RK1(64)|| . . . ||RKr−1(64) (2.5)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm out of the key K(k), as for the
encryption.
2.2 FOX128/k/r Skeleton
In this section, we describe the high-level structure of the 128-bit version of FOX in a top-down
approach.
The 128-bit version of FOX is the (r−1)-times iteration of a round function denoted elmor128,
followed by the application of a slightly modified version of elmor128, denoted by elmid128.
elmio128 is a function used during the decryption operation. Formally, elmor128, elmio128 and
elmid128 all take a 128-bit input X(128), a 128-bit round key RK(128) and return a 128-bit output
Y(128):
elmor128, elmio128, elmid128 :
{ {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}128 → {0, 1}128
(X(128), RK(128)) 7→ Y(128) (2.6)
2.2.1 Encryption
The encryption C(128) by FOX128/k/r of a 128-bit plaintext P(128) is formally defined as
C(128) , elmid128(elmor128(. . . (elmor128(P(128), RK0(128)), . . . , RKr−2(128)), RKr−1(128)) (2.7)
where
RK(r·128) , RK0(128)||RK1(128)|| . . . ||RKr−1(128) (2.8)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm out of the key K(k).
2.2.2 Decryption
The decryption P(128) by FOX128/k/r of a 128-bit ciphertext C(128) is formally defined as
P(128) , elmid128(elmio128(. . . (elmio128(C(128), RKr−1(128)), . . . , RK1(128)), RK0(128)) (2.9)








Figure 2.1: lmor64 Round Function
where
RK(r·128) , RK0(128)||RK1(128)|| . . . ||RKr−1(128) (2.10)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm out of the key K(k), as for the
encryption operation.
2.3 Internal Functions
In this section, we describe formally all the functions used internally in the core of both algo-
rithms FOX64/k/r and FOX128/k/r.
2.3.1 Definitions of lmor64, lmid64, lmio64
In the 64-bit version of the algorithm, one uses three slightly different round functions.
The first one, lmor64, illustrated in Fig. 2.1, is built as a Lai-Massey scheme combined with
an orthomorphism or, as described in [Vau00b]. This function transforms a 64-bit input X(64)
split in two parts X(64) , XL(32)||XR(32) and a 64-bit round key RK(64) in a 64-bit output
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Y(64) , YL(32)||YR(32) as follows:














The lmid64 function is a slightly modified version of lmor64, namely it is the same one without
the orthomorphism or:














Finally, lmio64 is defined by














2.3.2 Definitions of elmor128, elmid128, elmio128
In the 128-bit version of the algorithm, one uses also three slightly different round functions.
The first one, elmor128, illustrated in Fig. 2.2, is built as an Extended Lai-Massey scheme
combined with two orthomorphisms or. This function transforms a 128-bit input X(128) split
in four parts X(128) , XLL(32)||XLR(32)||XRL(32)||XRR(32) and a 128-bit round key RK(128) in a
128-bit output Y(128) , YLL(32)||YLR(32)||YRL(32)||YRR(32) as follows:
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XXXX
Y Y Y Y
LL(32) LR(32) RL(32) RR(32)
f64 RK(128)
LL(32) LR(32) RL(32) RR(32)
or or
Figure 2.2: Round function elmor128
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The elmid128 function is a slightly modified version of elmor128, namely it is the same one
without the orthomorphism or:






























Finally, elmio128 is defined by
































2.3.3 Definitions of or and io
The orthomorphism or is a function taking a 32-bit input X(32) , XL(16)||XR(16) and returning










or is in fact a one-round Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function. The inverse









2.3.4 Definition of f32
The function f32 builds the core of FOX64/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution
part, denoted sigma4, a diffusion part, denoted mu4, and a round key addition part (see Fig.
2.3).
Formally, the f32 function takes a 32-bit inputX(32), a 64-bit round keyRK(64) , RK0(32)||RK1(32)
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X X X X0(8) 1(8) 2(8) 3(8)
RK0(32)
sbox sbox sbox sbox
mu4
RK1(32)
sbox sbox sbox sbox
RK0(32)
YYYY
0(8) 1(8) 2(8) 3(8)
Figure 2.3: Function f32
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X X X X X X X X7(8)6(8)5(8)4(8)3(8)2(8)1(8)0(8)
sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox
mu8
sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox sbox
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y










Figure 2.4: Function f64
2.3.5 Definition of f64
The function f64 builds the core of FOX128/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution
part, denoted sigma8, a diffusion part, denoted mu8, and a round key addition part (see Fig.
2.4).
Formally, the f64 function takes a 64-bit inputX(64), a 128-bit round keyRK(128) , RK0(64)||RK1(64)
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2.3.6 Definition of sigma4, sigma8 and sbox
The function sigma4 takes a 32-bit input X(32) , X0(8)||X1(8)||X2(8)||X3(8) and returns a 32-bit






The function sigma8 takes a 64-bit input
X(64) , X0(8)||X1(8)||X2(8)||X3(8)||X4(8)||X5(8)||X6(8)||X7(8) (2.13)







Finally, the sbox function is the following lookup table:
sbox 0x.0 0x.1 0x.2 0x.3 0x.4 0x.5 0x.6 0x.7 0x.8 0x.9 0x.A 0x.B 0x.C 0x.D 0x.E 0x.F
0x0. 5D DE 00 B7 D3 CA 3C 0D C3 F8 CB 8D 76 89 AA 12
0x1. 88 22 4F DB 6D 47 E4 4C 78 9A 49 93 C4 C0 86 13
0x2. A9 20 53 1C 4E CF 35 39 B4 A1 54 64 03 C7 85 5C
0x3. 5B CD D8 72 96 42 B8 E1 A2 60 EF BD 02 AF 8C 73
0x4. 7C 7F 5E F9 65 E6 EB AD 5A A5 79 8E 15 30 EC A4
0x5. C2 3E E0 74 51 FB 2D 6E 94 4D 55 34 AE 52 7E 9D
0x6. 4A F7 80 F0 D0 90 A7 E8 9F 50 D5 D1 98 CC A0 17
0x7. F4 B6 C1 28 5F 26 01 AB 25 38 82 7D 48 FC 1B CE
0x8. 3F 6B E2 67 66 43 59 19 84 3D F5 2F C9 BC D9 95
0x9. 29 41 DA 1A B0 E9 69 D2 7B D7 11 9B 33 8A 23 09
0xA. D4 71 44 68 6F F2 0E DF 87 DC 83 18 6A EE 99 81
0xB. 62 36 2E 7A FE 45 9C 75 91 0C 0F E7 F6 14 63 1D
0xC. 0B 8B B3 F3 B2 3B 08 4B 10 A6 32 B9 A8 92 F1 56
0xD. DD 21 BF 04 BE D6 FD 77 EA 3A C8 8F 57 1E FA 2B
0xE. 58 C5 27 AC E3 ED 97 BB 46 05 40 31 E5 37 2C 9E
0xF. 0A B1 B5 06 6C 1F A3 2A 70 FF BA 07 24 16 C6 61
One should read this table as follows: to compute sbox(0x4C), one selects first the row named
0x4. (i.e. the fifth row), and then one selects the column named 0x.C (i.e. the thirteenth
column) and we get finally
sbox(0x4C) = 0x15 (2.14)
2.3.7 Definition of mu4
The diffusive part of f32 is a linear (4, 4)-multipermutation defined on GF(28). Formally, it is a
function taking a 32-bit input X(32) , X0(8)||X1(8)||X2(8)||X3(8) and returning a 32-bit output







1 1 1 α
1 c α 1
c α 1 1
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where
c , α−1 + 1 = α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + 1 (2.16)
All the additions and multiplications are defined in GF(28) using the representation described
in §1.6.
2.3.8 Definition of mu8
The diffusive part of f64 is a linear (8, 8)-multipermutation defined on GF(28). Formally, it is
a function taking a 64-bit input
X(64) , X0(8)||X1(8)||X2(8)||X3(8)||X4(8)||X5(8)||X6(8)||X7(8) (2.17)
and returning a 64-bit output
Y(64) , Y0(8)||Y1(8)||Y2(8)||Y3(8)||Y4(8)||Y5(8)||Y6(8)||Y7(8) (2.18)












1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a
1 a b c d e f 1
a b c d e f 1 1
b c d e f 1 a 1
c d e f 1 a b 1
d e f 1 a b c 1
e f 1 a b c d 1















a , α+ 1
b , α7 + α
c , α
d , α2
e , α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2
f , α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + α
All the additions and multiplications are defined in GF(28) using the representation described
in §1.6.
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2.4 Key Schedule
The key schedule is the algorithm which derives the subkey material
RK(r·64) , RK0(64)||RK1(64)|| . . . ||RKr−1(64) (2.20)
and
RK(r·128) , RK0(128)||RK1(128)|| . . . ||RKr−1(128) (2.21)
(for FOX64 and FOX128, respectively) out of the key K(k).
2.4.1 General Overview
A FOX key K(k) must have a bit-length k such that 0 ≤ k ≤ 256, and k must be a multiple of
8. Depending on the key length and the block size, a member of the FOX block cipher family
may use one among three different key-schedule algorithm versions, denoted respectively KS64,
KS64h and KS128. A constant, ek, depends on these values as well. The following table defines
precisely the relation between the key size, the block size, the constant ek and the key-schedule
algorithm version.
Cipher Block size Key size Key-Schedule Version ek
FOX64 64 0 ≤ k ≤ 128 KS64 128
FOX64 64 136 ≤ k ≤ 256 KS64h 256
FOX128 128 0 ≤ k ≤ 256 KS128 256
The three different versions of the key-schedule algorithm are constituted of four main parts: a
padding part, denoted P, expandingK(k) into ek bits, a mixing part, denotedM, a diversification
part, denoted D, whose core consists mainly in a linear feedback shift register denoted LFSR,
and finally, a non-linear part, denoted NLx (see Fig. 2.5 and Alg. 1 for a high-level overview of
the key-schedule algorithm design).
As outlined above, the key-schedule algorithm definition depends on a the number of rounds r,
on the key length k and on the cipher (FOX64 or FOX128). In fact, NLx is the only part which
differs between the different versions, and we will denote the three variants NL64, NL64h and
NL128.
2.4.2 Definition of KS64
This key-schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys smaller or equal to 128
bits. It takes the following parameters as input: a key K of length k bits, with 0 ≤ k ≤ 128
and a number of rounds r. It returns in output r 64-bit subkeys. KS64 is formally defined in
Alg. 2.









Figure 2.5: Key-Schedule Algorithm (High-Level Overview)
Algorithm 1 Key-Schedule Algorithm (High-Level Description)
/* Preprocessing */
PKEY ← P(K)
MKEY ← M(PKEY )
/* Initialization of the loop */
i← 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
DKEY ← D(MKEY, i, r)
Output RKi−1(x) ← NLx(DKEY )
i← i+ 1
end while
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Algorithm 2 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64
/* Preprocessing */
if k < ek then
PKEY , P(K)





/* Initialization of the loop */
i , 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
DKEY , D(MKEY, i, r)
Output RKi−1(64) , NL64(DKEY )
i , i+ 1
end while
2.4.3 Definition of KS64h
This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys larger than 128 bits.
It takes the following parameters as input: a key K of length k bits, with 136 ≤ k ≤ 256 and
a number of rounds r. It returns in output r 64-bit subkeys. KS64h is formally defined in Alg.
3.
2.4.4 Definition of KS128
This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX128. It takes the following parameters
as input: a key K of length k bits, with 0 ≤ k ≤ 256 and a number of rounds r. It returns in
output r 128-bit subkeys. KS128 is formally defined in Alg. 4.
2.4.5 Definition of P
The P-part, taking ek and k as input, is basically a function expanding a bit string by ek−k8
bytes. More precisely, then P concatenates the input key K with the first ek − k bits of the
constant pad, giving PKEY as output. The P function is defined formally in Alg. 5. The pad
constant value is defined in the following section.
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Algorithm 3 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64h
/* Preprocessing */
if k < ek then
PKEY , P(K)





/* Initialization of the loop */
i , 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
DKEY , D(MKEY, i, r)
Output RKi−1(64) , NL64h(DKEY )
i , i+ 1
end while
Algorithm 4 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS128
/* Preprocessing */
if k < ek then
PKEY , P(K)





/* Initialization of the loop */
i , 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
DKEY , D(MKEY, i, r)
Output RKi−1(128) , NL128(DKEY )
i , i+ 1
end while
Algorithm 5 P-Part
Output PKEY , K||pad[0...ek−k−1]
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2.4.6 Definition of pad









2.4.7 Definition of M
The M-part is used to mix the padded key PKEY , such that the constant words depend on
the randomness provided by the key, too. This is done with help of a Fibonacci recursion. It
takes as input a key PKEY with length ek (expressed in bits). More formally, the padded key
PKEY is seen as an array of ek8 bytes PKEYi(8), 0 ≤ i ≤ ek8 − 1, and is mixed according to
MKEYi(8) , PKEYi(8) ⊕
(
MKEYi−1(8) +MKEYi−2(8) mod 28
)
0 ≤ i ≤ ek
8
− 1 (2.22)
with the convention that
MKEY−2(8) , 0x6A and MKEY−1(8) , 0x76 (2.23)
2.4.8 Definition of D
The D-part is a diversification part. It takes a key MKEY having a length in bits equal to
ek, the total round number r, and the current round number i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r; it modifies
MKEY with help of the output of a 24-bit Linear Shift Feedback Register (LFSR) denoted





24-bit values MKEYj(24), with
0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊ ek24⌋−1 concatenated with one residue byteMKEY RB(8) (if ek = 128) or two residue
bytes MKEY RB(16) (if ek = 256), and is modified according to















and the DKEY RB(8) value (DKEY RB(16)) is obtained by XORing the most 8 (16) significant
bits of LFSR((i − 1) · ⌈ ek24⌉ + ⌊ ek24⌋ , r) with MKEY RB(8) (MKEY RB(16)), respectively. The
remaining 16 (8) bits of the LFSR routine output are discarded.
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2.4.9 Definition of LFSR
The diversification part D needs a stream of pseudo-random values; it is produced by a 24-bit
linear feedback shift register, denoted LFSR. This algorithm takes two inputs, the total number
of rounds r and a number of preliminary clocking c. It is based on the following primitive
polynomial of degree 24 over GF(2):
ξ24 + ξ4 + ξ3 + ξ + 1 (2.24)
The register is initially seeded with the value 0x6A||r(8)||r(8), where r(8) is expressed as an 8-bit
value. LSFR is described formally in Alg. 6.





while p < c do
p , p+ 1
if (reg ∧ 0x800000) 6= 0x000000 then
reg , (reg ¿ 1)⊕ 0x00001B
else




2.4.10 Definition of NL64
The NL64-part takes a single input: the 128-bit value DKEY corresponding to the current
round.
Basically, the DKEY value passes through a substitution layer (made of four parallel sigma4
functions), a diffusion layer (made of four parallel mu4 functions) and a mixing layer called
mix64. Then, the constant pad[0...127] is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek.
The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the
resulting value is encrypted first with a lmor64 round function, where the subkey is the left half
of the DKEY value and second by a lmid64 function, where the subkey is the right half of
DKEY . The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 2.6 illustrates the NL64
process and Alg. 7 describes it formally.
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condflip
mu4 mu4 mu4 mu4
lmor64
lmid64
sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4
sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4
RKEY
DKEY
Figure 2.6: NL64 Part
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t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32) , (t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32))⊕ pad[0..127]




t0(32)||t1(32) , (t0(32) ⊕ t2(32))||(t1(32) ⊕ t3(32))
t0(32)||t1(32) , lmor64(t0(32)||t1(32), DKEY[64...127])
t0(32)||t1(32) , lmid64(t0(32)||t1(32), DKEY[0...63])
Output t0(32)||t1(32) as round subkey.
2.4.11 Definition of NL64h
The NL64h-part takes a single input: the 256-bit value DKEY corresponding to the current
round.
Basically, theDKEY value passes through a substitution layer (made of eight parallel sigma4
functions), a diffusion layer (made of eight parallel mu4 functions) and a mixing layer called
mix64h. Then, the constant pad is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek. The
result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the resulting
value is encrypted first with three lmor64 round functions, where the respective subkeys are the
three left quarters of the DKEY value and secondly by a lmid64 function, where the subkey
is the rightmost quarter of DKEY . The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key.
Fig. 2.7 illustrates the NL64h process and Alg. 8 describes it formally.
2.4.12 Definition of NL128
The NL128-part takes a single different input: the 256-bit value DKEY corresponding to the
current round.
Basically, the DKEY value passes through a substitution layer (made of four parallel sigma8
functions), a diffusion layer (made of four parallel mu8 functions) and a mixing layer called
mix128. Then, the constant pad is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek. The
result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 128 bits and the resulting
value is encrypted first with a elmor128 round function, where the subkey is the left half of the
DKEY value and second by a elmid128 function, where the subkey is the right half of DKEY .
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sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4
sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4 sigma4
DKEY
RKEY
Figure 2.7: NL64h Part
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Algorithm 8 NL64h Part
/* Initialization */
t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32),DKEY
/* Substitution Layer */
t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32),sigma4(t0(32))||sigma4(t1(32))||sigma4(t2(32))||sigma4(t3(32))
t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32),sigma4(t4(32))||sigma4(t5(32))||sigma4(t6(32))||sigma4(t7(32))





if k = ek then
t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32),t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32)
end if
/* Substitution Layer */
t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32),sigma4(t0(32))||sigma4(t1(32))||sigma4(t2(32))||sigma4(t3(32))
t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32),sigma4(t4(32))||sigma4(t5(32))||sigma4(t6(32))||sigma4(t7(32))
/* Hashing Layer */
t0(32)||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32),(t0(32)⊕t1(32))||(t2(32)⊕t3(32))||(t4(32)⊕t5(32))||(t6(32)⊕t7(32))
t0(32)||t1(32),(t0(32)⊕t2(32))||(t1(32)⊕t3(32))





Output t0(32)||t1(32) as round subkey.
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The resulting value is defined to be the 128-bit round key. Fig. 2.8 illustrates the NL128 process
and Alg. 9 describes it formally.





t0(64)||t1(64)||t2(64)||t3(64) , (t0(64)||t1(64)||t2(64)||t3(64))⊕ pad




t0(64)||t1(64) , (t0(64) ⊕ t2(64))||(t1(64) ⊕ t3(64))
t0(64)||t1(64) , elmor128(t0(64)||t1(64), DKEY[128...255])
t0(64)||t1(64) , elmid128(t0(64)||t1(64), DKEY[0...127])
Output t0(64)||t1(64) as round subkey.
2.4.13 Definition of mix64
Given an input vector of four 32-bit values, denoted
X , X0(32)||X1(32)||X2(32)||X3(32) (2.25)
the mix64 function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output
vector denoted Y , Y0(32)||Y1(32)||Y2(32)||Y3(32). More formally, mix64 is defined as
Y0(32) , X1(32) ⊕X2(32) ⊕X3(32)
Y1(32) , X0(32) ⊕X2(32) ⊕X3(32)
Y2(32) , X0(32) ⊕X1(32) ⊕X3(32)
Y3(32) , X0(32) ⊕X1(32) ⊕X2(32)
2.4.14 Definition of mix64h
Given an input vector of eight 32-bit values, denoted
X , X0(32)||X1(32)||X2(32)||X3(32)||X4(32)||X5(32)||X6(32)||X7(32) (2.26)
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Figure 2.8: NL128 Part
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the mix64h function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an out-
put vector denoted Y , Y0(32)||Y1(32)||Y2(32)||Y3(32)||Y4(32)||Y5(32)||Y6(32)||Y7(32). More formally,
mix64h is defined as
Y0(32) , X2(32) ⊕X4(32) ⊕X6(32)
Y1(32) , X3(32) ⊕X5(32) ⊕X7(32)
Y2(32) , X0(32) ⊕X4(32) ⊕X6(32)
Y3(32) , X1(32) ⊕X5(32) ⊕X7(32)
Y4(32) , X0(32) ⊕X2(32) ⊕X6(32)
Y5(32) , X1(32) ⊕X3(32) ⊕X7(32)
Y6(32) , X0(32) ⊕X2(32) ⊕X4(32)
Y7(32) , X1(32) ⊕X3(32) ⊕X5(32)
2.4.15 Definition of mix128
Given an input vector of four 64-bit values, denoted X , X0(64)||X1(64)||X2(64)||X3(64), the
mix64 function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector
denoted Y , Y0(64)||Y1(64)||Y2(64)||Y3(64). More formally, mix128 is defined as
Y0(64) , X1(64) ⊕X2(64) ⊕X3(64)
Y1(64) , X0(64) ⊕X2(64) ⊕X3(64)
Y2(64) , X0(64) ⊕X1(64) ⊕X3(64)
Y3(64) , X0(64) ⊕X1(64) ⊕X2(64)




In this chapter, some explanations and justifications about the choices made during the design of
FOX are provided. In §3.1, we recall some results of Vaudenay which provide a strong theoretical
security foundation to both Lai-Massey and Extended Lai-Massey schemes as defined in §2.1
and §2.2, respectively. In §3.2, we describe how the non-linear part sbox has been designed, and
its security characteristics; the diffusion part, i.e. the mu4 and mu8 functions, are described in
§3.3. Finally, in §3.4, we provide some motivations in the context of the key-schedule algorithm.
3.1 Skeletons
3.1.1 Lai-Massey Scheme
We recall briefly in this section results of Vaudenay [Vau00b] about the Lai-Massey scheme.
Pseudo-randomness and Super Pseudo-Randomness
A distinguisher A is a probabilistic Turing machine with unlimited computation power. It has
access to an oracle O and can send it a limited number of queries. At the end, the distinguisher
must output “0” or “1”. The advantage for distinguishing a random function f from a random
function g is defined by
Adv(f, g) ,
∣∣∣Pr [AO=f = 1]− Pr [AO=g = 1]∣∣∣ (3.1)
From this point, we will make use of the following notation: given an orthomorphism o on a
group (G,+) and given r functions f1, f2, . . . , fr on G, we note a r-rounds Lai-Massey scheme
using the r functions and the orthomorphism as defined in §2.1 by
Λo(f1, . . . , fr) (3.2)
Then the following result is a Luby-Rackoff-like [LR88] result on the Lai-Massey scheme. We
refer to [Vau00b] for a complete proof.
Pascal Junod and Serge Vaudenay, 16-12-2003 – 34/92–
FOX Specifications v1.0
Theorem 1 Let f∗1 , f∗2 and f∗3 be three independent random functions uniformly distributed on
a group (G,+). Let o be an orthomorphism1 on G. For any distinguisher limited to d chosen
plaintexts, where g = |G| denotes the cardinality of the group, between Λo(f∗1 , . . . , f∗3) and a
uniformly distributed random permutation c∗, we have
Adv(Λo(f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
3), c
∗) ≤ d(d− 1)(g−1 + g−2) (3.3)
Super-pseudorandomness corresponds to cases where distinguishers can query chosen ciphertexts
as well. In this scenario, the following result [Vau00b] asserts that rounds can provide super-
pseudorandomness in a Lai-Massey scheme.
Theorem 2 Let f∗1 , f∗2 , f∗3 and f∗4 be four independent random functions uniformly distributed
on a group (G,+). Let o be an orthomorphism on G. For any distinguisher limited to d
chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts, where g = |G| denotes the cardinality of the group, between
Λo(f∗1 , . . . , f∗r ) and a uniformly distributed random permutation c∗, we have
Adv(Λo(f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
4), c
∗) ≤ d(d− 1)(g−1 + g−2) (3.4)
In summary, the two previous theorems show that the Lai-Massey scheme, as defined in §2.1
provides pseudo-randomness on three rounds and super-pseudorandomness on four rounds, like
for the Feistel scheme [Fei73].
Decorrelation Inheritance
We recall here briefly some notions related to the concept of decorrelation (see [Vau03] for more
details). Given an integer d and a random function f from a given set M1 to a given set M2,
one defines the d-wise distribution matrix [f]d as a matrix in RMd1×Md2 by [f]d(x1,...,xd)(y1,...,yd) ,
Pr[f(x1) = y1, . . . , f(xd) = yd] For a matrix A in RM
d
















Decd||.||a(c) , ||[c]d − [c∗]d||a (3.6)
where c∗is a uniformly distributed random permutation. We know that Adv(c, c∗) ≤ 12Decd||.||a
for any distinguisher limited to d chosen plaintexts.
As pointed out in [Vau00b], it is possible to use results of [Vau00a] for showing that the
decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme is inherited by the whole
structure. This is stated formally by the following theorem:
1An orthomorphism on a group (G,+) is a permutation o(x) such that o(x)− x is also a permutation.
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Theorem 3 If f1, . . . , fr are r ≥ 3 independent random functions on a group (G,+) of order g
such that ||fi − f∗i ||a ≤ ² for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and if o is an orthomorphism on G, we have
Decd||.||a(Λ
o(f1, . . . , f3) ≤ (3²+ d(d− 1)(2g−1 + g−2))b
r
3c (3.7)
This results shows that provided the fi’s are strong, so is the Lai-Massey scheme.
3.1.2 Extended Lai-Massey Scheme
One can show that an extended Lai-Massey scheme can be seen as a (classical) Lai-Massey
scheme, and thus inherits all the “good properties” of a Lai-Massey scheme, as discussed in the
previous section. For this, one needs the following result.
Lemma 1
The application defined by {
({0, 1}32)2 → ({0, 1}32)2
(x, y) 7→ (or(x), or(y))
is an orthomorphism, where or(.) is the orthomorphism defined in Section 2.3.3.
Proof: First, we show that this application is a permutation. This follows from the fact that
the inverse application is given by
(x′, y′) 7→ (io(x′), io(y′))
and that io is a permutation, too. Now, we have to check that
(x, y) 7→ (or(x)⊕ x, or(y)⊕ y) (3.8)
is also a permutation. This follows easily from the fact that (3.8) is an invertible application.
♦
From this lemma, we can deduce that an Extended Lai-Massey scheme is nothing but a Lai-
Massey scheme. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Resistance Towards Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis
We prove now some interesting properties of an Extended Lai-Massey scheme regarding differ-
ential and linear characteristics.
Theorem 4 In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in §2.2, any differential character-
istic on two rounds must involve at least one f64-function.
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Figure 3.1: An alternative view of an Extended Lai-Massey scheme
Proof: We follow a top-down approach. If we stack up two rounds of an Extended Lai-Massey
scheme (see Fig. 3.2 for a detailed illustration of one round) and we force a differential charac-
teristic at the input of the first f64-function to be equal to 0, then a differential characteristic
at the input of the two rounds must have the form (a, b, a, b, c, d, c, d) with a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}16
and a, b, c, d are not all equal to 0. At the end of the first round, the differential characteristic
sounds (b, a⊕ b, a, b, d, c⊕ d, c, d). At the input of the second f64-function, the differential char-
acteristic is equal to (a⊕ b, a, c⊕d, c). We proceed by contraposition. If the input of the second
f64-function is equal to zero, we have a = c = 0. As a ⊕ b and c ⊕ d must be both equal to 0,
the we conclude that a = b = c = d = 0. This is a contradiction to our primary assumption
about a, b, c and d, and the theorem follows. ♦
Theorem 5 In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in Fig. 2.2, any linear character-
istic on two rounds must involve at least one f64-function.
Proof: We follow a bottom-up approach. By forcing a linear characteristic to be equal to
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) at the end of the second f64-function, we note that the output linear charac-
teristic must have the form (a, a⊕d, a⊕d, d, b, b⊕c, b⊕c, c) with a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}16 and a, b, c, d
not all equal to 0. If we consider now the first f64-function, we note that a linear characteristic
at its output must have the form (d, a⊕ d, b, b⊕ c), which implies that a = b = 0 and then that
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f64
Figure 3.2: Extended Lay-Massey Scheme (detailed description)
x 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7 0x8 0x9 0xA 0xB 0xC 0xD 0xE 0xF
S1(x) 0x2 0x5 0x1 0x9 0xE 0xA 0xC 0x8 0x6 0x4 0x7 0xF 0xD 0xB 0x0 0x3
S2(x) 0xB 0x4 0x1 0xF 0x0 0x3 0xE 0xD 0xA 0x8 0x7 0x5 0xC 0x2 0x9 0x6
S3(x) 0xD 0xA 0xB 0x1 0x4 0x3 0x8 0x9 0x5 0x7 0x2 0xC 0xF 0x0 0x6 0xE
Figure 3.3: Small S-boxes S1, S2 and S3
c = d = 0, which is a contradiction to our assumption. The theorem follows. ♦
3.2 sbox Transformation
In this section, we describe the motivations behind the definition of the S-box sbox and some
of its security properties.
As defined in §2.3.6, sbox is a permutation mapping 8-bit inputs to 8-bit outputs. It consists
in a Lai-Massey scheme with 3 rounds taking three different substitution boxes as round func-
tion; these “small” S-boxes are denoted S1, S2 and S3, and their content is given in Fig. 3.3.
The structure of sbox is depicted in Fig. 3.4. The orthomorphism or4 used in the Lai-Massey
scheme is a single round of a 4-bit Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function
(see Fig. 3.5).









Figure 3.4: Structure of sbox
We describe now the generation process of the sbox transformation. First a set of three different
candidates for small substitution boxes, each having a LPmax and a DPmax smaller than 2−2
where pseudo-randomly chosen, with the common notations
DPsbox(a, b) , Pr[sbox(X ⊕ a) = sbox(X)⊕ b] (3.9)
LPsbox(a,b) , (2 · Pr[a ·X = b · sbox(X)]− 1)2 (3.10)







Then, the candidate sbox mapping was evaluated and tested regarding its LPmax and DPmax
values, which are required to be smaller or equal to 2−4. This process has been iterated until a
good candidate was found.





and its algebraic degree is equal to 6.





Figure 3.5: The orthomorphism or4
3.3 mu4 and mu8 Transformations
In this section, we describe the rationales behind the main diffusion parts of both algorithms,
namely the mu4 and mu8 functions.
3.3.1 Linear Multipermutations
Both mu4 and mu8 are linear multipermutations. This kind of construction was early recognized
as being optimal for which regards its diffusion properties [SV95].
A linear application defined by a matrix A is a multipermutation if and only if det(A) 6= 0
and if the determinant of each submatrix of A is different of zero as well. It is well-known that
one can construct linear multipermutations out of MDS linear codes (i.e. Maximum Distance
Separable codes). Although this approach leads to very elegant constructions, they are not
all very efficient to implement, especially on low-end smartcard, which have usually very few
available memory and computational power.
Both mu4 and mu8 have the structure of the following matrix:
1 1 . . . 1 ξ
1 ζ1 . . . ζn 1






ζn−1 ζn . . . ζn−2 1
ζn 1 . . . ζn−1 1

(3.14)
where ξ ∈ {ζi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. In order to be efficiently implementable, the elements of the matrix,
which are elements of GF(28), should have a low Hamming weight, since the only really efficient
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operations are the addition, the multiplication by α and the division by α: indeed, one should
note that
α7 + α = α−1 + α−2
α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 = α−1
α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + α = α−2
Thus, a search among possible combinations of “acceptable” elements {ζi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} has been
done, until good matrices were found.
3.3.2 Security properties of f32 and f64
In this part, we prove some important results about the security of both f32 and f64 functions
towards linear and differential cryptanalysis. As these functions may be viewed as classical
Substitution-Permutation Network constructions, we will refer to some well-known results on
their resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis proved in [HLL+01].
Differential Cryptanalysis
In the following, we denote δ , δ1δ2δ3δ4, d , d1d2d3d4, D , D1D2D3D4 and ∆ , ∆1∆2∆3∆4
a differential at input, after the first layer of S-boxes, after the mu4 application and at output,
respectively (see Fig. 3.6).












Note that the value of (3.15), provided the round keys are uniformly distributed, does not
depend on their values. As the mu4 construction is a (4, 4)-multipermutation, one is ensured








We can extend these computations to the f64-function (as defined in Fig. 2.4), noting that
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δ δ δ δ1 2 3 4
d d dd1 2 3 4
D D D D
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
sbox sbox sbox sbox








Figure 3.6: Differential Characteristic of a f32-function.
By taking into account Theorem 4, we obtain the following result, which can be used to define
requirements on the minimal number of rounds needed to resist differential cryptanalysis.






Theorem 9 The probability of a (single-path) differential characteristic in FOX128/k/r is up-





The computations regarding linear cryptanalysis are very similar to the ones done in the previous
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By taking into account Theorem 4, we obtain the following result, which can be used to define
requirements on the minimal number of rounds needed to resist linear cryptanalysis.












In this part, we describe the motivations behind each one of the four parts constituting the key
schedule algorithm.
3.4.1 General Rationales
The FOX key-schedule algorithm was designed with the following rationales in mind:
• The function taking a key K and the round number r in output and returning r subkeys
should be a cryptographic pseudo-random, collision resistant and one-way function.
• The computational complexity of the key-schedule algorithm should not be penalized when
the key-size is equal to 128 for FOX64 or to 256 for FOX128.
• The computational complexity of the key-schedule algorithm should not be penalized in
FOX64 when the key size is smaller than 128 bits.
• The sequence of subkeys should be generated in any direction without a complexity
penalty.
• All the bytes of MKEY should be randomized even when the key size is strictly smaller
than ek.
• MKEY should be expanded by XORing constants depending on r and ek with no overlap
on these constants sequences.
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• As FOX is a variable-round cipher, the key-schedule algorithm should resist related-cipher
attacks as described by Wu in [Wu02]. More precisely, the subkey sequence must depend
on the actual round number of the algorithm instance for which the sequence will be used.
3.4.2 P-Part
The goal of the P-part is to transform the user-provided key, which may have any length multiple
of 8 smaller or equal than 256, in a fixed-size of 128-bit or 256-bit value. The chosen padding
constant e− 2 was checked regarding the following property.
Lemma 1 It is impossible to find two values of K with a length strictly smaller than 256 bits
which lead to the same value of PKEY .
Proof: In order for two different inputs to produce the same output during the padding operation,
one has to concatenate the smaller one with a padding value which is contained in the one used
for the larger input; this is only possible if the first ` bytes of the padding constant are present
in another location. The lemma follows from the fact that the first byte 0xB7 is unique in the
constant. ♦
Note that in order to avoid that a padded key and non-padded key generates the same subkey
sequence, a conditional negation has been incorporated in the NLx part of the key-schedule
algorithm.
3.4.3 M-Part
When using small keys, a large part of the key-schedule state is known to a potential adversary:
it is the padding constant. The goal of the M-part is hence to mix the entropy on all bytes.
The following lemma insures that, when fed with two different inputs, the M-part will return
two different outputs.
Lemma 2 The M-part is a permutation.
Proof: The lemma follows from the fact that the M-part is an invertible application. ♦
3.4.4 L-Part
The goal of the L-part is to diversify the DKEY register (which serves as input for the NLx-
part) at each round. The main design goals are its simplicity and its reversibility: as a LFSR
step is equivalent to the multiplication by a constant in a finite field, the inverse operation is a
division by the same constant. It is thus possible to evaluate the L in both directions. It was
furthermore checked that the outputs (being 144 or 264 bits) for all 12 ≤ r ≤ 255 and all round
numbers 1 ≤ i ≤ r are unique.
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3.4.5 NLx-Part
The goal of the NL part is to generate a pseudo-random stream of data as “cryptographically
secure” as possible and as fast as possible. For this, it re-uses the round functions in its core,
and it needs only a few supplementary operations.




In this chapter, we handle several issues linked to implementation aspects.
4.1 32/64-bit Platforms
Most modern CPUs architecture are 32- or 64-bit ones. In this section, we list several ways to
optimize an implementation of FOX in terms of speed (i.e. of throughput).
4.1.1 Subkeys Precomputation
Most of the time, block ciphers are used to encrypt several blocks of data, so it is very time-
sparing to precompute the subkeys once for all and to store them in a table. Typically, one
needs 128 bytes of memory to store all the subkeys for an implementation of FOX64 with 16
rounds and twice as much for FOX128.
4.1.2 Implementation of f32 and f64 Using Table-Lookups
The f32 and f64 functions can be implemented very efficiently using a combinations of table-
lookups and XORs. We will focus on the f32 function, but the considerations are similar for
which concerns f64.
Let X0(8)||X1(8)||X2(8)||X3(8) be an input of f32. We denote by T0(8)||T1(8)||XT2(8)||T3(8)
the temporary result obtained after the mu4 application. Let RK0(8)||RK1(8)||RK2(8)||RK3(8)







1 1 1 α
1 c α 1
c α 1 1








Pascal Junod and Serge Vaudenay, 16-12-2003 – 46/92–
FOX Specifications v1.0































































 = TBSM0[V0(8)]⊕ TBSM1[V1(8)]⊕ TBSM2[V2(8)]⊕ TBSM3[V3(8)] (4.2)
Similarly, after the second key-addition layer of f32, by denoting U0(8)||U1(8)||U2(8)||U3(8) this
temporary result before the last substitution layer and by denoting W0(8)||W1(8)||W2(8)||W3(8),



































 = TBS0[U0(8)]⊕ TBS1[U1(8)]⊕ TBS2[U2(8)]⊕ TBS3[U3(8)] (4.3)
As outlined before, the process is similar for the implementation of the f64 function. In this case,
we have to define two times 8 tables of 256 64-bit elements. The following table summarizes
the size of the various tables for a fully-precomputed implementation :
number of tables width [bytes] total size [bytes]
FOX64 2× 4 4 8′192
FOX128 2× 8 8 32′768
Depending on the target processor, the nearest cache (i.e. the fastest memory) size may be
smaller than 32’768 bytes. In this case, one can spare half of the tables (at the cost of a
few masking operations) by noting that all the TBS tables are “embedded” in the TBSM ones;
this implementation strategy will by denoted half-precomputed implementation. This allows
to reduce the fast memory needs to 4’096 and 16’384 bytes, respectively. The following table
summarizes the L1 cache size of various processors:
Processor cache size [kB] Note Impl
Alpha 21164 8 (data) ?
Alpha 21264 64 (data) ∗
AMD Athlon XP 128 (data + code) ∗
AMD Athlon MP 128 (data + code) ∗
AMD Opteron 64 (data) ∗
Intel Pentium III 16 (data) •
Intel Pentium IV 8 (data) ?
Intel Xeon 8 (data) ?
Intel Itanium 16 (data) •
Intel Itanium2 16 (data) •
PowerPC G4 32 (data + code) •
PowerPC G5 32 (data) ∗
UltraSparc II 16 (data) •
UltraSparc III 64 (data) ∗
Large and Very Large L1 Caches
For most modern microprocessors (denoted by ∗ in the above table), a fully-precomputed im-
plementation of FOX64 and FOX128 is probably the fastest possible solution. For the processors
denoted by • , a half-precompted implementation is probably the best solution. The supple-
mentary masking operations may be furthermore used to increase the instructions throughput
on pipelined architectures.
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Small L1 Caches
Some microprocessors have a very small L1 data cache (they are denoted in ? in the above
table). In these cases, in the case of FOX128, even a half-precomputed implementation will
result in many caches misses, inducing a performance penalty. For an Intel Pentium IV, a
half-precomputed implementation of FOX64 is advantageous, while one can reduce the size of
the precomputed data needed for a FOX128 implementation down to 8’192 bytes at the cost
of at most 18 supplementary PSHUFW instructions. Although these operations will result in a
performance penalty, the latter will be reduced since the highly-parrallelizable structure of the
f64 function allows to fully use the pipeline and thus to improve the instructions throughput.
Improving the Instruction Throughput
As most modern CPU architectures are pipelined ones, one can take this fact into account in
order to improve performances of FOX implementations. There are two “dependency walls” in
a FOX round function. The first one is just after the first subkey addition, the second one just
after the second subkey addition. Inbetween, the additions of the table-lookup results may be
done in any order, as an XOR is a commutative addition.
64-bit Capabilities of 32-bit Microprocessors
FOX128 is an excellent candidate for using the 64-bit instructions of actual 32-bit micropro-
cessors. For instance, on the Intel architecture, the MMX/SSE/SSE2 instructions sets may be
used to “emulate” a 64-bit microprocessor.
Transforming the Extended Lai-Massey Scheme in a Lai-Massey Scheme
By expressing the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as in Fig. 3.1, one can compute very efficiently
the two orthomorphisms as a single one on 64-bit architectures.
Compilers / Data Structures
In order to get the best performances for FOX implementations written in a high-level language
(like C), one can get big speed differences when using different compilers. Furthermore, the
choice of the data structure of the precomputed tables and of the data to be encrypted plays an
important role: implementing a simple way to access these data will result in a speed increase.
4.1.3 Key-Schedule Algorithms
For applications needing a high key-agility, one can implement the various key-schedule algo-
rithms using the same guidelines and tricks as for the core algorithm, since they share many
common features.
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4.2 8-bit Platforms
The resources representing the most important bottleneck in a block cipher implementation on
a smartcard (which uses typically low-cost, 8-bit microprocessors) is of course the RAM usage.
The amount of efficiently usable RAM available on a smartcard is typically in the order of 256
bytes. It may be a bit larger depending on the cases, but as this type of smart card is devoted to
contain more than a simple encryption routine, FOX implementations on this kind of platforms
will minimize the amount of necessary RAM. ROM is not so scarce as RAM on a smartcard, so
the code size can be greater than the RAM usage. It is usually reasonable not to have a ROM
size (instructions + possible precomputed tables) greater than 1024 bytes.
4.2.1 Four Memory Usage Strategies
Obviously, the most intensive computation are related to the evaluation of the sbox mapping
and of the mu4 and mu8 mappings. We propose in the following table four different (the last
one concerning uniquely FOX128) strategies using various amounts of precomputed data to
implement these mappings. Note that the precomputed data may be stored in ROM and that
the constants needed in the key-schedule algorithm are not taken into account.
Strategy Precomputations Data size
A No precomputed data 24 B
B sbox(x) 256 B
C sbox(x), talpha(x), dalpha(x) 768 B
D sbox, stalpha(x), sdalpha(x), stalpha2(x), sdalpha2(x) 1280 B
Strategy A can be applied when extremely few memory is available. For this, one computes
on-the-fly the sbox mapping, as it is described in §3.2, and all the operations in GF (28). The
sole needed constants are the small substitution boxes S1, S2 and S3 (see Fig. 3.3). Strategy A
is clearly the slowest strategy.
A significant speed gain can be obtained if one precomputes the sbox mapping (Strategy B),
the finite field operations being all computed dynamically.
A third possibility (Strategy C) is to precompute two more mappings: talpha(x) is a function
mapping an element x to α · x, with the multiplication in GF (28); dalpha(x) is a function
mapping an element x ∈ GF (28) to α−1 · x.
Finally, in the case of FOX128, a further speed gain may be obtained (Strategy D) by
tabulating the five following mappings:
sbox(x) : x 7→ sbox(x)
stalpha(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α
sdalpha(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α−1
stalpha2(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α2
sdalpha2(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α−2
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4.2.2 Implementation of f32
The implementation of the sigma4/mu4 layer is relatively straighforward:
Y0(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ α · sbox(X3(8))
Y1(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ α · sbox(X2(8))⊕ α−1 · sbox(X1(8))
Y2(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ α · sbox(X1(8))⊕ α−1 · sbox(X0(8))
Y3(8) = sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ α · sbox(X0(8))⊕ α−1 · sbox(X2(8))
By carefully rewriting the above equations and by re-using some temporary results, one can
easily minimize the number of sbox, talpha, dalpha evaluations and the number of ⊕ operations.
However, the resulting implementation is strongly dependent of the chosen strategy (as discussed
in §4.2.1).
4.2.3 Implementation of f64
The implementation of the sigma8/mu8 layer is not much complicated. By rewriting the oper-
ations as done above, one can easily obtain a fast implementation. For instance, in case of an
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implementation following memory strategy C, one can obtain the following computations:
Y0(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕
sbox(X4(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ α · sbox(X7(8))
Y1(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ α · sbox(X4(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))))
Y2(8) = sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ α · sbox(X3(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))))
Y3(8) = sbox(X5(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ α · sbox(X2(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))))
Y4(8) = sbox(X4(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ α · sbox(X1(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X3(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))))
Y5(8) = sbox(X3(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X4(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ α · sbox(X0(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))))
Y6(8) = sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X3(8))⊕ sbox(X5(8))⊕ α · sbox(X6(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))))
Y7(8) = sbox(X1(8))⊕ sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X7(8))⊕
α · (sbox(X2(8))⊕ sbox(X4(8))⊕ α · sbox(X5(8))⊕
α−1 · (sbox(X3(8))⊕ sbox(X6(8))⊕ α−1 · (sbox(X0(8))⊕ sbox(X3(8))))
This computation flow (consisting of 71 ⊕, 15 talpha and 15 dalpha evaluations) is obviously
not optimal in terms of operations; by using redundant temporary computations, one can spare
a few more operations.
4.2.4 Implementation of talpha and dalpha
We give here a constant-time implementation of talpha and dalpha. The routines talpha2 and
dalpha2 can be implemented by iterating twice talpha and dalpha, respectively. Note that these
implementation does not take into account security issues related to other side-channel attacks,
like SPA/DPA.
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;; Implementation of talpha() on 8051
;;
;; R0 : input
;; R0 : output
MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RLC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #F9 ;; C set ? A = 0xF9 : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A
;; Implementation of dalpha() on 8051
;;
;; R0 : input
;; R0 : output
MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RRC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #FC ;; C set ? A = 0xFC : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A
4.3 Hardware Implementations
In a hardware implementation, one spare table-lookups for sbox by taking into account its
structure, as described in §3.2. For instance, most FPGAs may implement directly any 4-bit to
4-bit boolean mappings, which allows to wire directly sbox.
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6 FOX64/16/128 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF
7 FOX64/16/128 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
8 FOX64/16/128 ciphertext : FAC289D2 9CB9BAFF




13 FOX64/16/192 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988
14 FOX64/16/192 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
15 FOX64/16/192 ciphertext : D53B1866 7ECB7070




20 FOX64/16/256 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988 77665544 33221100
21 FOX64/16/256 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
22 FOX64/16/256 ciphertext : 87B551DF 4364C5D9




27 FOX128/16/128 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF
28 FOX128/16/128 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
29 FOX128/16/128 ciphertext : FA8E215A B8471AB2 71ABFFA1 34591451




34 FOX128/16/192 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988
35 FOX128/16/192 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
36 FOX128/16/192 ciphertext : 8E5B723A 5996745E FA898BE6 A1034361
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41 FOX128/16/256 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988 77665544 33221100
42 FOX128/16/256 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
43 FOX128/16/256 ciphertext : FF852954 AA5954DA 7A936AFE 1F4DEDB3
44 FOX128/16/256 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210





1 FOX / Reference implementation
2 Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch>
3 $Id: README,v 1.2 2003/09/24 11:08:02 pjunod Exp $
4 --------------------------------------------------
5
6 The sole purpose of this reference code is to output
7 a set of test vectors and to help understanding the
8 structure of FOX. It is not fast, not portable, not
9 elegant and not secure. It implements a full
10 precomputed table-lookup strategy.
11
12 The code has been written for the IA32 architecture,
13 which is a little-endian architecture. It won’t work
14 on a big-endian architecture.
B.2 File Makefile
1 #############################################################
2 ## FOX project / Reference implementation ##
3 ## Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> ##
4 ## ##
5 ## $Id: Makefile,v 1.5 2003/09/24 11:13:27 pjunod Exp $ ##
6 #############################################################
7
8 EXEC_NAME = fox_util
9
10 CFLAGS = -W -Wall -pedantic -g
11
12 objects = fox128.o fox64.o fox_ctx.o fox_cst.o fox_util.o
13
14 all: $(objects)
15 $(CC) -o $(EXEC_NAME) $(objects)
16
17 $(objects): %.o: %.c %.h
18 $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $< -o $@
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19
20 .PHONY: clean debug
21
22 clean:
23 -rm -f $(objects) *~ $(EXEC_NAME)
24
B.3 File fox portable.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */
5 /* Base file is "nessie.h" */








14 typedef signed char sint8;
15 typedef unsigned char uint8;
16
17 #if UINT_MAX >= 4294967295UL
18
19 typedef signed short sint16;
20 typedef signed int sint32;
21 typedef unsigned short uint16;
22 typedef unsigned int uint32;
23




28 typedef signed int sint16;
29 typedef signed long sint32;
30 typedef unsigned int uint16;
31 typedef unsigned long uint32;
32




37 #define ONE8 0xffU
38 #define ONE16 0xffffU
39
40 #define TO8(x) ((x) & ONE8)
41 #define TO16(x) ((x) & ONE16)
42 #define TO32(x) ((x) & ONE32)
43
44 #define EXTRACT8_BIT(d, b) ((((uint8)(d)) & ((uint8)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
45 #define EXTRACT16_BIT(d, b) ((((uint16)(d)) & ((uint16)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
46 #define EXTRACT32_BIT(d, b) ((((uint32)(d)) & ((uint32)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
47
48 #define ROTL8(v, n) ((uint8)((v) << (n)) | ((uint8)(v) >> (8 - (n))))
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49 #define ROTL16(v, n) ((uint16)((v) << (n)) | ((uint16)(v) >> (16 - (n))))
50 #define ROTL32(v, n) ((uint32)((v) << (n)) | ((uint32)(v) >> (32 - (n))))
51
52 /*
53 * U8TO32_BIG(c) returns the 32-bit value stored in big-endian convention
54 * in the unsigned char array pointed to by c.
55 */
56
57 #define U8TO32_BIG(c) (((uint32)TO8(*(c)) << 24) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 1)) << 16) | \
58 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 2)) << 8) |\
59 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 3))))
60
61 /*
62 * U8TO32_LITTLE(c) returns the 32-bit value stored in little-endian convention
63 * in the unsigned char array pointed to by c.
64 */
65
66 #define U8TO32_LITTLE(c) (((uint32)TO8(*(c))) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 1)) << 8) | \
67 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 2)) << 16) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 3)) << 24))
68
69 /*
70 * U32TO8_BIG(c, v) stores the 32-bit-value v in big-endian convention
71 * into the unsigned char array pointed to by c.
72 */
73
74 #define U32TO8_BIG(c, v) do { \
75 uint32 x = (v); \
76 uint8 *d = (c); \
77 d[0] = TO8(x >> 24); \
78 d[1] = TO8(x >> 16); \
79 d[2] = TO8(x >> 8); \
80 d[3] = TO8(x); \
81 } while (0)
82
83 /*
84 * U32TO8_LITTLE(c, v) stores the 32-bit-value v in little-endian convention
85 * into the unsigned char array pointed to by c.
86 */
87
88 #define U32TO8_LITTLE(c, v) do { \
89 uint32 x = (v); \
90 uint8 *d = (c); \
91 d[0] = TO8(x); \
92 d[1] = TO8(x >> 8); \
93 d[2] = TO8(x >> 16); \
94 d[3] = TO8(x >> 24); \
95 } while (0)
96
97 #endif /* _FOX_PORTABLE_H_ */
B.4 File fox error.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */
5 /* $Id: fox_error.h,v 1.2 2002/11/19 15:30:03 pjunod Exp $ */







11 #define FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION "\nError: impossible to allocate enough memory"
12 #define FOX_ERROR_CONTEXT_INITIALIZATION "\nError: could not initialize a context"
13 #define FOX_ERROR_TABLE_INITIALIZATION "\nError: could not initialize a table"
14 #define FOX_ERROR_KEY_INITIALIZATION "\nError: could not initialize a key"
15 #define FOX_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TABLE_ID "\nError: unknown table ID"
16 #define FOX_ERROR_UNKNOWN_MODE "\nError: unknown mode"
17 #define FOX_BUG "\nError: probably a bug"
18
19 #endif /* _FOX_ERROR_H_ */
B.5 File fox cst.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */








13 /* Constants */
14
15 #define FOX_NUMBER_ROUNDS FOX_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN
16
17 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0 0x00
18 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID1 0x01
19 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID2 0x02
20 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID3 0x03
21
22 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID0 0x04
23 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID1 0x05
24 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID2 0x06
25 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID3 0x07
26
27 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID0 0x08
28 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID1 0x09
29 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID2 0x0A
30 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID3 0x0B
31
32 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID0 0x10
33 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID1 0x11
34 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID2 0x12
35 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID3 0x13
36 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID4 0x14
37 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID5 0x15
38 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID6 0x16
39 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID7 0x17
40
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41 /* FOX_IRRPOLY = x^8+x^7+x^6+x^5+x^4+x^3+1 */
42
43 #define FOX_IRRPOLY 0x1F9
44
45 /* These are the first decimal of e-2 */
46
47 extern const uint8 FOX_KEY_PAD[32];
48
49 /* The three "small" S-boxes */
50
51 extern const uint8 FOX_S1[16];
52 extern const uint8 FOX_S2[16];
53 extern const uint8 FOX_S3[16];
54
55 /* Constants used in the key-schedule algorithm */
56
57 extern const uint8 FOX_MKEYM2;
58 extern const uint8 FOX_MKEYM1;
59
60 extern const uint32 FOX_LFSR_C;
61 extern const uint32 FOX_LFSR_FP;
62
63 #endif /* _FOX_CST_H_ */
B.6 File fox cst.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */






11 /* These are the first decimal of e-2 */
12
13 const uint8 FOX_KEY_PAD[32] = { 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x62, 0x8A, 0xED, 0x2A, 0x6A,
14 0xBF, 0x71, 0x58, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0xC7,
15 0x62, 0xE7, 0x16, 0x0F, 0x38, 0xB4, 0xDA, 0x56,
16 0xA7, 0x84, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x51, 0x90, 0xCF, 0xEF };
17
18 /* The three "small" S-boxes */
19
20 const uint8 FOX_S1[16] = { 0x2, 0x5, 0x1, 0x9,
21 0xE, 0xA, 0xC, 0x8,
22 0x6, 0x4, 0x7, 0xF,
23 0xD, 0xB, 0x0, 0x3 };
24
25 const uint8 FOX_S2[16] = { 0xB, 0x4, 0x1, 0xF,
26 0x0, 0x3, 0xE, 0xD,
27 0xA, 0x8, 0x7, 0x5,
28 0xC, 0x2, 0x9, 0x6 };
29
30 const uint8 FOX_S3[16] = { 0xD, 0xA, 0xB, 0x1,
31 0x4, 0x3, 0x8, 0x9,
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32 0x5, 0x7, 0x2, 0xC,
33 0xF, 0x0, 0x6, 0xE };
34
35 /* Constants used in the key-schedule algorithm */
36
37 const uint8 FOX_MKEYM2 = 0x6A;
38 const uint8 FOX_MKEYM1 = 0x76;
39
40 const uint32 FOX_LFSR_C = 0x006A0000UL;
41 const uint32 FOX_LFSR_FP = 0x0100001BUL;
42
B.7 File fox ctx.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */









14 /* Types */
15
16 typedef uint8 FOX_mode;
17
18







26 typedef FOX_key_ *FOX_key;
27
28






35 typedef FOX_table_ *FOX_table;
36
37















51 typedef FOX64_ctx_ *FOX64_ctx;
52

















70 typedef FOX128_ctx_ *FOX128_ctx;
71
72
73 /* Exportable routines */
74
75 extern int FOX64_init_ctx (FOX64_ctx *);
76 extern void FOX64_clean_ctx (FOX64_ctx);
77
78 extern int FOX128_init_ctx (FOX128_ctx *);
79 extern void FOX128_clean_ctx (FOX128_ctx);
80
81
82 extern int FOX64_init_key (FOX_key *, const FOX64_ctx,
83 const uint32 *, const uint32,
84 const uint8);
85 extern void FOX64_clean_key (FOX_key);
86
87 extern int FOX128_init_key (FOX_key *, const FOX128_ctx,
88 const uint32 *, const uint32,
89 const uint8);
90 extern void FOX128_clean_key (FOX_key);
91
92 extern void FOX_io (uint32 *);
93 extern void FOX_or (uint32 *);
94
95
96 /* Internal routines */
97
98 int FOX_init_table (FOX_table *, const uint8);
99 void FOX_clean_table (FOX_table);
100
101 uint32 FOX_times_alpha (const uint32);
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102 uint32 FOX_div_alpha (const uint32);
103
104 uint32 FOX_eval_sbox (const uint32 x, const uint8 *s1,
105 const uint8 *s2, const uint8 *s3);
106
107
108 #endif /* _FOX_CTX_H_ */
B.8 File fox ctx.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal.junod@epfl.ch> */
4 /* */















20 void FOX_or (uint32 *data)
21 {
22 uint32 l, r;
23
24 assert (data != NULL);
25
26 l = *data >> 16;
27 r = *data & 0xFFFF;
28
29 *data = (r << 16) | (l ^ r);
30 }
31
32 void FOX_io (uint32 *data)
33 {
34 uint32 l, r;
35
36 assert (data != NULL);
37
38 l = *data >> 16;
39 r = *data & 0xFFFF;
40
41 *data = (( l ^ r) << 16) | l;
42 }
43
44 uint32 FOX_times_alpha (const uint32 input)
45 {
46
47 if (input) {
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48 return (input & 0x80) ? (input << 1) ^ FOX_IRRPOLY : input << 1;





54 uint32 FOX_div_alpha (const uint32 input)
55 {
56
57 if (input) {
58 return (input & 0x01) ? (input ^ FOX_IRRPOLY) >> 1 : input >> 1;









68 if ( (ctx = malloc (sizeof (FOX64_ctx_))) == NULL) {
69 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION);
70 goto error_label;
71 }
72 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_0, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0)) {
73 goto error_label;
74 }
75 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_1, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID1)) {
76 goto error_label;
77 }
78 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_2, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID2)) {
79 goto error_label;
80 }
81 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_3, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID3)) {
82 goto error_label;
83 }
84 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_0, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID0)) {
85 goto error_label;
86 }
87 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_1, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID1)) {
88 goto error_label;
89 }
90 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_2, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID2)) {
91 goto error_label;
92 }


















109 void FOX64_clean_ctx (FOX64_ctx ctx)
110 {



















130 if ( (ctx = malloc (sizeof (FOX128_ctx_))) == NULL) {
131 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION);
132 goto error_label;
133 }
134 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_0, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID0)) {
135 goto error_label;
136 }
137 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_1, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID1)) {
138 goto error_label;
139 }
140 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_2, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID2)) {
141 goto error_label;
142 }
143 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_3, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID3)) {
144 goto error_label;
145 }
146 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_4, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID4)) {
147 goto error_label;
148 }
149 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_5, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID5)) {
150 goto error_label;
151 }
152 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_6, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID6)) {
153 goto error_label;
154 }
155 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_7, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID7)) {
156 goto error_label;
157 }
158 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_0, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID0)) {
159 goto error_label;
160 }
161 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_1, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID1)) {
162 goto error_label;
163 }
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164 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_2, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID2)) {
165 goto error_label;
166 }















182 void FOX128_clean_ctx (FOX128_ctx ctx)
183 {



















203 int FOX64_init_key (FOX_key *ptr,
204 const FOX64_ctx ctx,
205 const uint32 *words,
206 const uint32 length,
207 const uint8 rounds)
208 {
209 FOX_key key;
210 uint32 i, j;
211 uint32 k, o;
212 uint8 temp8[32];
213 uint8 dkey[32];
214 uint32 dkey32[8], temp32[8];




219 assert (length <= 256);
220 assert (length % 8 == 0);
221
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222 if ( (key = malloc (sizeof (FOX_key_))) == NULL) {
223 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION);
224 goto error_label;
225 }
226 if ( (key->exp_key = malloc (sizeof (uint32) * 2 * rounds )) == NULL) {




231 memcpy (key->raw_key, words, (length >> 3));
232
233 /* Endianness issue here ! */
234 for (k = 0; k < (length >> 5); k++) {
235 U32TO8_BIG (temp8 + (k * 4), words[k]);
236 }
237
238 /* Size in 32-bit words */
239 key->key_length = length >> 5;
240
241 key->rounds = rounds;
242
243 /* Computation of the state bit b and of ek */
244
245 if ( (length == 128) || (length == 256) ) {
246 b = 1;
247 } else {
248 b = 0;
249 }
250
251 if (length <= 128) {
252 ek = 128;
253 } else {
254 ek = 256;
255 }
256
257 /* P-part */
258
259 if (length < ek) {
260 for (i = (length >> 3), j = 0; i < 32; i++, j++) {




265 /* M-part */
266
267 if (length < ek) {
268 temp8[0] ^= (FOX_MKEYM2 + FOX_MKEYM1);
269 temp8[1] ^= (FOX_MKEYM1 + temp8[0]);
270 for (i = 2; i < (ek >> 3); i++) {




275 /* D-Part */
276
277 /* Initialization of the LFSR */
278 lfsr_state = FOX_LFSR_C | ((uint32)rounds << 8) | (~rounds & 0xFF);
279
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280 /* We back-clock the LFSR once */
281 if (lfsr_state & 0x1) {
282 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
283 }
284 lfsr_state >>= 1;
285
286 for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
287 j = 0;
288 while (j < (ek >> 3)) {
289 if ( (j % 3) == 0 ) {
290 /* We have to clock the LFSR */
291 lfsr_state <<= 1;
292 if (lfsr_state & 0x01000000) {
293 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
294 }
295 /* Endianness issue here ! */
296 U32TO8_BIG (lfsr, lfsr_state);
297 }




302 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
303 dkey32[j] = U8TO32_BIG (dkey + (j << 2));
304 }
305
306 /* NL-part : we feed the current DKEY to the NLx part */
307 /* sigma4 - mu4 operation */
308 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
309 o = ctx->sigma4_mu4_0->val[(dkey32[j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
310 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_1->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
311 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_2->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
312 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_3->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x000000FF)];
313 dkey32[j] = o;
314 }
315
316 if (ek == 128) {
317 /* mix64 operation */
318 temp32[0] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[3];
319 temp32[1] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[3];
320 temp32[2] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[3];
321 temp32[3] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[2];
322 } else {
323 /* mix64h operation */
324 temp32[0] = dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[4] ^ dkey32[6];
325 temp32[1] = dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[5] ^ dkey32[7];
326 temp32[2] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[4] ^ dkey32[6];
327 temp32[3] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[5] ^ dkey32[7];
328 temp32[4] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[6];
329 temp32[5] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[7];
330 temp32[6] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[4];
331 temp32[7] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[5];
332 }
333 /* Constant addition */
334 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
335 temp32[j] ^= U8TO32_BIG (FOX_KEY_PAD + (j << 2));
336 }
337 /* Conditional flip */
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338 if (b) {
339 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {




344 /* sigma4 operation */
345 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
346 o = ctx->sigma4_0->val[(temp32[j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
347 o ^= ctx->sigma4_1->val[(temp32[j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
348 o ^= ctx->sigma4_2->val[(temp32[j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
349 o ^= ctx->sigma4_3->val[(temp32[j] & 0x000000FF)];
350 temp32[j] = o;
351 }
352
353 if (ek == 128) {
354 /* Hashing */
355 dkey32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[2];
356 dkey32[1] = temp32[1] ^ temp32[3];
357
358 /* Encryption phase */
359 FOX_lmor64 (dkey32, words, ctx);
360 FOX_lmid64 (dkey32, words + 2, ctx);
361 *(key->exp_key + 2*i) = dkey32[0];
362 *(key->exp_key + 2*i) = dkey32[1];
363 } else {
364 /* Hashing */
365 dkey32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[1];
366 dkey32[1] = temp32[2] ^ temp32[3];
367 dkey32[2] = temp32[4] ^ temp32[5];
368 dkey32[3] = temp32[6] ^ temp32[7];
369
370 temp32[0] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey[1];
371 temp32[1] = dkey32[2] ^ dkey[3];
372 /* Encryption phase */
373 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, words, ctx);
374 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, words + 2, ctx);
375 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, words + 4, ctx);
376 FOX_lmid64 (temp32, words + 6, ctx);
377 *(key->exp_key + 2*i) = temp32[0];














392 void FOX64_clean_key (FOX_key k)
393 {
394 if (k != NULL) {
395 if (k->exp_key != NULL) {
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396 free (memset (k->exp_key, 0x00, k->rounds * 2 * sizeof (uint32)));
397 }




402 int FOX128_init_key (FOX_key *ptr,
403 const FOX128_ctx ctx,
404 const uint32 *words,
405 const uint32 length,
406 const uint8 rounds)
407 {
408 FOX_key key;





414 uint32 dkey32[8], temp32[8];




419 assert (length <= 256);
420 assert (length % 8 == 0);
421
422 if ( (key = malloc (sizeof (FOX_key_))) == NULL) {
423 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION);
424 goto error_label;
425 }
426 if ( (key->exp_key = malloc (sizeof (uint32) * 4 * rounds )) == NULL) {




431 memcpy (key->raw_key, words, (length >> 3));
432
433 /* Endianness issue here ! */
434 for (k = 0; k < (length >> 5); k++) {
435 U32TO8_BIG (temp8 + (k * 4), words[k]);
436 }
437
438 /* Size in 32-bit words */
439 key->key_length = length >> 5;
440
441 key->rounds = rounds;
442
443 /* Computation of the state bit b and of ek */
444
445 if ( length == 256 ) {
446 b = 1;
447 } else {
448 b = 0;
449 }
450 ek = 256;
451
452
453 /* P-part */
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454
455 if (length < ek) {
456 for (i = (length >> 3), j = 0; i < 32; i++, j++) {




461 /* M-part */
462
463 if (length < ek) {
464 temp8[0] ^= (FOX_MKEYM2 + FOX_MKEYM1);
465 temp8[1] ^= (FOX_MKEYM1 + temp8[0]);
466 for (i = 2; i < (ek >> 3); i++) {




471 /* D-Part */
472
473 /* Initialization of the LFSR */
474 lfsr_state = FOX_LFSR_C | ((uint32)rounds << 8) | (~rounds & 0xFF);
475
476 /* We back-clock the LFSR once */
477 if (lfsr_state & 0x1) {
478 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
479 }
480 lfsr_state >>= 1;
481
482 for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
483 j = 0;
484 while (j < (ek >> 3)) {
485 if ( (j % 3) == 0 ) {
486 /* We have to clock the LFSR */
487 lfsr_state <<= 1;
488 if (lfsr_state & 0x01000000) {
489 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
490 }
491 /* Endianness issue here ! */
492 U32TO8_BIG (lfsr, lfsr_state);
493 }




498 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
499 dkey32[j] = U8TO32_BIG (dkey8 + (j << 2));
500 }
501
502 /* NL Part */
503
504 /* sigma8 - mu8 operation */
505 for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
506 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
507 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
508 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
509 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
510 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
511 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
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512 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
513 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x000000FF) << 1)+ 1];
514
515 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
516 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
517 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
518 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
519 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
520 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
521 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
522 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF) << 1) + 1];
523
524 dkey32[2*j] = o[0];
525 dkey32[2*j + 1] = o[1];
526 }
527
528 /* mix128 operation */
529
530 temp32[0] = dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[4] ^ dkey32[6];
531 temp32[1] = dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[5] ^ dkey32[7];
532 temp32[2] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[4] ^ dkey32[6];
533 temp32[3] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[5] ^ dkey32[7];
534 temp32[4] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[6];
535 temp32[5] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[7];
536 temp32[6] = dkey32[0] ^ dkey32[2] ^ dkey32[4];
537 temp32[7] = dkey32[1] ^ dkey32[3] ^ dkey32[5];
538
539 /* Constant addition */
540 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
541 temp32[j] ^= U8TO32_BIG (FOX_KEY_PAD + (j << 2));
542 }
543 /* Conditional flip */
544 if (b) {
545 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {




550 /* sigma8 operation */
551 for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
552 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
553 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
554 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
555 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(dkey32[2*j] & 0x000000FF)];
556
557 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
558 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
559 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
560 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF)];
561
562 dkey32[2*j] = o[0];
563 dkey32[2*j + 1] = o[1];
564 }
565
566 dkey32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[4];
567 dkey32[1] = temp32[1] ^ temp32[5];
568 dkey32[2] = temp32[2] ^ temp32[6];
569 dkey32[3] = temp32[3] ^ temp32[7];
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570
571 /* Encryption phase */
572 FOX_elmor128 (dkey32, words, ctx);
573 FOX_elmid128 (dkey32, words + 4, ctx);
574
575 *(key->exp_key + 4*i) = temp32[0];
576 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 1) = temp32[1];
577 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 2) = temp32[2];
578 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 3) = temp32[3];
579 }
580










591 void FOX128_clean_key (FOX_key k)
592 {
593 if (k != NULL) {
594 if (k->exp_key != NULL) {
595 free (memset (k->exp_key, 0x00, k->rounds * 4 * sizeof (uint32)));
596 }




601 int FOX_init_table (FOX_table *ptr, const uint8 id)
602 {
603 uint32 i, size, tmp;
604 FOX_table table;
605
606 if ( (table = malloc (sizeof (FOX_table_))) == NULL) {




611 if (id & 0x10) {
612 size = 2;
613 } else {
614 size = 1;
615 }
616
617 if ( (table->val = malloc (256 * sizeof(uint32) * size)) == NULL) {
618 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION);
619 goto error_label;
620 }
621 table->id = id;
622 table->size_bytes = 256 * sizeof(uint32) * size;
623
624 switch (id) {
625
626 case FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0:
627 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
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628 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
629 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
630 table->val[i] |= tmp << 16;
631 table->val[i] |= (FOX_div_alpha(tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;





637 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
638 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
639 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
640 table->val[i] |= (FOX_div_alpha(tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
641 table->val[i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;





647 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
648 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
649 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
650 table->val[i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
651 table->val[i] |= tmp << 8;





657 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
658 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
659 table->val[i] = FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 24;
660 table->val[i] |= tmp << 16;
661 table->val[i] |= tmp << 8;





667 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
668 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
669 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
670 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 16;
671 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;
672 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp)));
673 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 24;
674 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
675 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 8;





681 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
682 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
683 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
684 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
685 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 8;
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686 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp);
687 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 24;
688 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 16;
689 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 8;





695 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
696 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
697 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
698 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 16;
699 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;
700 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp));
701 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 24;
702 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
703 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 8;





709 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
710 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
711 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
712 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
713 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 8;
714 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp);
715 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 24;
716 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 16;
717 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;





723 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
724 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
725 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
726 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
727 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 8;
728 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp));
729 table->val[2*i+1] = tmp << 24;
730 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
731 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 8;





737 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
738 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
739 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
740 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 16;
741 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 8;
742 table->val[2*i] |= tmp;
743 table->val[2*i+1] = (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 24;
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744 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 16;
745 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;





751 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
752 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
753 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
754 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
755 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 8;
756 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp);
757 table->val[2*i+1] = (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 24;
758 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
759 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 8;





765 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
766 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
767 table->val[2*i] = (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 24;
768 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 16;
769 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 8;
770 table->val[2*i] |= tmp;
771 table->val[2*i+1] = tmp << 24;
772 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 16;
773 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 8;






780 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {






787 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {






794 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {






801 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
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822 void FOX_clean_table (FOX_table table)
823 {
824 if (table != NULL) {
825 if (table->val != NULL) {
826 free (memset (table->val, 0x00, table->size_bytes));
827 }




832 uint32 FOX_eval_sbox (const uint32 x, const uint8 *s1,
833 const uint8 *s2, const uint8 *s3)
834 {
835 uint8 l, r, ll, lr, state;
836
837 assert ( (x <= 0xFF) && (s1 != NULL) && (s2 != NULL) && (s3 != NULL) );
838
839 l = (x & 0xF0) >> 4;
840 r = (x & 0x0F);
841
842 /* Stage 1 */
843
844 state = s1[l ^ r];
845 l ^= state;
846 r ^= state;
847
848 ll = (l & 0xC) >> 2;
849 lr = (l & 0x3);
850
851 l = (lr << 2) | (ll ^ lr);
852
853 /* Stage 2 */
854
855 state = s2[l ^ r];
856 l ^= state;
857 r ^= state;
858
859 ll = (l & 0xC) >> 2;
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860 lr = (l & 0x3);
861
862 l = (lr << 2) | (ll ^ lr);
863
864 /* Stage 3 */
865
866 state = s3[l ^ r];
867 l ^= state;
868 r ^= state;
869
870 ll = (l & 0xC) >> 2;
871 lr = (l & 0x3);
872
873 l = (lr << 2) | (ll ^ lr);
874
875 /* Saving of the value */
876




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */









14 #define FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT 0x0
15 #define FOX64_MODE_DECRYPT 0x1
16
17 #define FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN 12
18 #define FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_SECURE 16
19
20 #define FOX64_encrypt(p, k, ctx) FOX64_process((p), (k), (ctx), FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT)
21 #define FOX64_decrypt(c, k, ctx) FOX64_process((c), (k), (ctx), FOX64_MODE_DECRYPT)
22
23 extern int FOX64_process (uint32 *, const FOX_key, const FOX64_ctx, const FOX_mode);
24
25 void FOX_lmor64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
26 void FOX_lmid64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
27 void FOX_lmio64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
28 void FOX_f32 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
29
30 #endif /* _FOX64_H_ */




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */












17 int FOX64_process (uint32 *data, const FOX_key k,





23 assert (data != NULL);
24 assert (k != NULL);
25 assert (ctx != NULL);
26
27 assert (k->rounds >= FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
28
29 input[0] = data[0];
30 input[1] = data[1];
31
32 switch (mode) {
33
34 case FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT:
35 for (r = 0; r < k->rounds - 1; r++) {
36 FOX_lmor64 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 2), ctx);
37 }




42 for (r = k->rounds - 1; r > 0; r--) {
43 FOX_lmio64 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 2), ctx);
44 }








53 data[0] = input[0];
54 data[1] = input[1];
55
56 return 0;




59 void FOX_lmor64 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
60 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
61 {
62 uint32 tmp[2], f;
63
64 tmp[0] = data[0];
65 tmp[1] = data[1];
66
67 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
68 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
69 tmp[0] ^= f;
70 tmp[1] ^= f;
71 FOX_or (tmp);
72
73 data[0] = tmp[0];
74 data[1] = tmp[1];
75 }
76
77 void FOX_lmid64 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
78 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
79 {
80 uint32 tmp[2], f;
81
82 tmp[0] = data[0];
83 tmp[1] = data[1];
84
85 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
86 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
87 tmp[0] ^= f;
88 tmp[1] ^= f;
89
90 data[0] = tmp[0];
91 data[1] = tmp[1];
92 }
93
94 void FOX_lmio64 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
95 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
96 {
97 uint32 tmp[2], f;
98
99 tmp[0] = data[0];
100 tmp[1] = data[1];
101
102 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
103 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
104 tmp[0] ^= f;
105 tmp[1] ^= f;
106 FOX_io (tmp);
107
108 data[0] = tmp[0];
109 data[1] = tmp[1];
110 }
111
112 void FOX_f32 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
113 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
114 {
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115 uint32 i, o;
116
117 i = *data;
118
119 i ^= key[0];
120
121 o = ctx->sigma4_mu4_0->val[(i & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
122 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_1->val[(i & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
123 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_2->val[(i & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
124 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_3->val[(i & 0x000000FF)];
125
126 o ^= key[1];
127
128 i = ctx->sigma4_0->val[(o & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
129 i ^= ctx->sigma4_1->val[(o & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
130 i ^= ctx->sigma4_2->val[(o & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
131 i ^= ctx->sigma4_3->val[(o & 0x000000FF)];
132




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */









14 #define FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT 0x0
15 #define FOX128_MODE_DECRYPT 0x1
16
17 #define FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN 12
18 #define FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_SECURE 16
19
20 #define FOX128_encrypt(p, k, ctx) FOX128_process((p), (k), (ctx), FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT)
21 #define FOX128_decrypt(c, k, ctx) FOX128_process((c), (k), (ctx), FOX128_MODE_DECRYPT)
22
23 extern int FOX128_process (uint32 *, const FOX_key, const FOX128_ctx, const FOX_mode);
24
25 void FOX_elmor128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
26 void FOX_elmid128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
27 void FOX_elmio128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
28
29 void FOX_f64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
30
31 #endif /* _FOX128_H_ */




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */












17 int FOX128_process (uint32 *data, const FOX_key k,





23 assert (data != NULL);
24 assert (k != NULL);
25 assert (ctx != NULL);
26
27 assert (k->rounds >= FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
28
29 input[0] = data[0];
30 input[1] = data[1];
31 input[2] = data[2];
32 input[3] = data[3];
33
34 switch (mode) {
35
36 case FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT:
37 for (r = 0; r < k->rounds - 1; r++) {
38 FOX_elmor128 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 4), ctx);
39 }




44 for (r = k->rounds - 1; r > 0; r--) {
45 FOX_elmio128 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 4), ctx);
46 }








55 data[0] = input[0];
56 data[1] = input[1];
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57 data[2] = input[2];





63 void FOX_elmor128 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
64 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
65 {
66 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
67
68 tmp[0] = data[0];
69 tmp[1] = data[1];
70 tmp[2] = data[2];
71 tmp[3] = data[3];
72
73 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
74 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
75
76 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
77
78 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
79 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
80 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
81 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
82
83 FOX_or (tmp);
84 FOX_or (tmp + 2);
85
86 data[0] = tmp[0];
87 data[1] = tmp[1];
88 data[2] = tmp[2];
89 data[3] = tmp[3];
90 }
91
92 void FOX_elmid128 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
93 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
94 {
95 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
96
97 tmp[0] = data[0];
98 tmp[1] = data[1];
99 tmp[2] = data[2];
100 tmp[3] = data[3];
101
102 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
103 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
104
105 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
106
107 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
108 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
109 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
110 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
111
112 data[0] = tmp[0];
113 data[1] = tmp[1];
114 data[2] = tmp[2];
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115 data[3] = tmp[3];
116 }
117
118 void FOX_elmio128 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
119 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
120 {
121 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
122
123 tmp[0] = data[0];
124 tmp[1] = data[1];
125 tmp[2] = data[2];
126 tmp[3] = data[3];
127
128 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
129 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
130
131 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
132
133 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
134 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
135 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
136 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
137
138 FOX_io (tmp);
139 FOX_io (tmp + 2);
140
141 data[0] = tmp[0];
142 data[1] = tmp[1];
143 data[2] = tmp[2];
144 data[3] = tmp[3];
145 }
146
147 void FOX_f64 (uint32 *data, const uint32 *key,
148 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
149 {
150 uint32 i[2], o[2];
151
152 i[0] = data[0];
153 i[1] = data[1];
154
155 i[0] ^= key[0];
156 i[1] ^= key[1];
157
158 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[(i[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
159 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[((i[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
160 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[(i[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
161 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[((i[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
162 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[(i[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
163 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[((i[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
164 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[(i[0] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
165 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[((i[0] & 0x000000FF) << 1)+ 1];
166
167 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[(i[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
168 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[((i[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
169 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[(i[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
170 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[((i[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
171 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[(i[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
172 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[((i[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
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173 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[(i[1] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
174 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[((i[1] & 0x000000FF) << 1) + 1];
175
176 o[0] ^= key[2];
177 o[1] ^= key[3];
178
179 i[0] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(o[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
180 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(o[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
181 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(o[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
182 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(o[0] & 0x000000FF)];
183
184 i[1] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(o[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
185 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(o[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
186 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(o[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
187 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(o[1] & 0x000000FF)];
188
189 data[0] = i[0] ^ key[0];
190 data[1] = i[1] ^ key[1];
191 }
B.13 File fox util.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */








13 int fox64_128_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
14 int fox64_192_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
15 int fox64_256_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
16
17 int fox128_128_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
18 int fox128_192_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
19 int fox128_256_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k);
20
21 #endif /* _FOX_UTIL_H_ */
B.14 File fox util.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */
















19 const uint32 p64[2] = {0x01234567, 0x89ABCDEF};
20
21 const uint32 p128[4] = {0x01234567, 0x89ABCDEF, 0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210};
22
23 const uint32 k[8] = {0x00112233, 0x44556677, 0x8899AABB, 0xCCDDEEFF,
24 0xFFEEDDCC, 0xBBAA9988, 0x77665544, 0x33221100 };
25
26
27 int main ()
28 {
29 int return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
30
31 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX test vectors generator");
32 fprintf (stdout, "\n--------------------------\n\n");
33
34 /* FOX64 test vectors */
35 if (fox64_128_16_test (p64, k)) {
36 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
37 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
38 goto error_label;
39 }
40 if (fox64_192_16_test (p64, k)) {
41 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
42 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
43 goto error_label;
44 }
45 if (fox64_256_16_test (p64, k)) {
46 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");




51 /* FOX128 test vectors */
52 if (fox128_128_16_test (p128, k)) {
53 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
54 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
55 goto error_label;
56 }
57 if (fox128_192_16_test (p128, k)) {
58 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
59 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
60 goto error_label;
61 }
62 if (fox128_256_16_test (p128, k)) {
63 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");

















79 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
80
81 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
82 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
83 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
84 goto error_label;
85 }
86 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/128 key : ");
87 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
88 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
89 }
90 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 message : ");
91 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
92 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
93 }
94 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 128, 16)) {
95 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
96 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
97 goto error_label;
98 }
99 memcpy (c, p, 8);
100 FOX64_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
101 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 ciphertext : ");
102 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
103 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
104 }
105 FOX64_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
106 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 message : ");
107 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
108 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
109 }














124 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
125
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126 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
127 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
128 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
129 goto error_label;
130 }
131 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/192 key : ");
132 for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
133 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
134 }
135 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 message : ");
136 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
137 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
138 }
139 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 192, 16)) {
140 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
141 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
142 goto error_label;
143 }
144 memcpy (c, p, 8);
145 FOX64_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
146 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 ciphertext : ");
147 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
148 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
149 }
150 FOX64_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
151 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 message : ");
152 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
153 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
154 }













168 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
169
170 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
171 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
172 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
173 goto error_label;
174 }
175 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/256 key : ");
176 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
177 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
178 }
179 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 message : ");
180 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
181 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
182 }
183 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 256, 16)) {
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184 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
185 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
186 goto error_label;
187 }
188 memcpy (c, p, 8);
189 FOX64_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
190 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 ciphertext : ");
191 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
192 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
193 }
194 FOX64_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
195 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 message : ");
196 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
197 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
198 }














213 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
214
215 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
216 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
217 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
218 goto error_label;
219 }
220 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/128 key : ");
221 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
222 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
223 }
224 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 message : ");
225 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
226 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
227 }
228 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 128, 16)) {
229 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
230 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
231 goto error_label;
232 }
233 memcpy (c, p, 16);
234 FOX128_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
235 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 ciphertext : ");
236 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
237 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
238 }
239 FOX128_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
240 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 message : ");
241 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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242 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
243 }














258 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
259
260 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
261 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
262 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
263 goto error_label;
264 }
265 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/192 key : ");
266 for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
267 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
268 }
269 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 message : ");
270 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
271 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
272 }
273 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 192, 16)) {
274 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
275 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
276 goto error_label;
277 }
278 memcpy (c, p, 16);
279 FOX128_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
280 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 ciphertext : ");
281 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
282 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
283 }
284 FOX128_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
285 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 message : ");
286 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
287 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
288 }









298 int fox128_256_16_test (const uint32 *p, const uint32 *k)
299 {





303 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
304
305 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
306 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
307 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
308 goto error_label;
309 }
310 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/256 key : ");
311 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
312 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", k[i]);
313 }
314 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 message : ");
315 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
316 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", p[i]);
317 }
318 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 256, 16)) {
319 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
320 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
321 goto error_label;
322 }
323 memcpy (c, p, 16);
324 FOX128_encrypt (c, key, ctx);
325 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 ciphertext : ");
326 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
327 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
328 }
329 FOX128_decrypt (c, key, ctx);
330 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 message : ");
331 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
332 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c[i]);
333 }
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